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The choice of performance measures, target setting and vesting levels in UK 
firms’ CEO compensation contract 
 
This paper analyses the influences on the choice of performance measure in CEO compensation contracts, for a 
sample of 3400 plans from 400 UK firms between 2007 and 2015. We analyse the link between the choice of 
performance measure and the volatility of earnings per share (EPS) and total shareholder return (TSR), taking 
into account four different performance categories, in that a firm may use either EPS or TSR, or both, or neither. 
This allows us to utilise a comprehensive cross-section of plans and account for when both EPS and TSR are 
jointly employed. Our results are robust to controlling for plan types, consultant, industry, and time specific effects. 
We find that EPS in combination with TSR is the most common performance metric employed by firms. We also 
find that firms with higher EPS volatility and lower TSR volatility are more likely to choose TSR as a performance 
measure, and that firms with higher EPS volatility are less likely to choose EPS alone; we argue that these results 
are consistent with optimal contracting theory. Secondly, we conduct a novel, detailed description of the 
performance measures, comparator groups, plan choices, threshold targets and vesting levels at minimum and 
maximum threshold, used in the construction of CEO compensation contracts. Descriptive statistics provide new 
detail on the different types of EPS measure used in compensation contracts, and in the case of TSR measures, 
reveal new information on the choice of comparator groups (FTSE indices vs. self- selected peer groups vs. sector 
peers). We further argue that commonalities across firms in the elements of target-setting are evidence for 
institutional isomorphism.  
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1! Introduction 
!
There have been widespread concerns not only on excessive levels of CEO pay but also on the 
mechanics of incentivization. Prior to the 1990s, the vesting of stock options and restricted 
shares were time-dependent. However, in 1995 the Greenbury Report recommended that UK 
firms should incorporate rewards dependent upon the firm performance, in preference to 
traditional time-vested options and restricted stock shares. Successive versions of corporate 
governance code have resulted in the shift of the landscape for long-term incentive plans, to 
strengthen interest alignment between executives and shareholders. Since 2002, UK firms have 
been required to disclose the components of their long-term incentive plans and the 
performance targets attached to the compensation contracts as per the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Regulations 2002 (DRRR, 2002) and other corporate governance codes. 
The executive compensation literature has generally focused on examining the association 
between executive compensation and firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004 and Ozkan, 2007). Even though, as Murphy (1999) notes, the type of 
performance measure forms an integral part of compensation structures, along with the levels 
of target setting, only a limited number of studies have analysed these contractual terms (e.g. 
Gao et al., 2017; De Angelis and Grinstein, 2015 and Li and Wang, 2016), and whether 
contracts are designed optimally is still a matter of debate. Additionally, we observe a paradox: 
while there is greater transparency within annual reports as to the details of their remuneration 
processes, there is little understanding of the general norms and trends in performance targets, 
and their effects in terms of how the detail of the contractual terms affect actual payout are not 
well understood by investors or the general public. 
This chapter contributes to the debate by drawing on a novel dataset whose richness and breadth 
provides the opportunity to examine the current landscape of long-term incentive plans and 
their features. While most studies have examined the US firms, research on executive 
compensation in the UK has made a limited survey of performance measures and targets with 
sample period for these studies ending in 2003 (e.g. Conyon et al., 2000; Pass et al., 2000 and 
Zakaria, 2012). 
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the global literature on the contractual terms 
of executive compensation. First, we document a wider array of performance categories 
employed in CEO compensation contracts than previous studies. Secondly, we provide novel 
details on vesting levels pertaining to minimum and maximum thresholds of EPS performance 
measures. Thirdly, we provide new detail on the different relative benchmarks and the use of 
outperformance plans which trigger vesting when market-based performance measures are set 
beyond the upper quartile percentile ranking (i.e. in the highest quintile). Fourthly, for 
accounting-based performance measures, we present new detail on the breakdown of different 
types of EPS and relative targets. Finally, we perform a novel empirical analysis on the effect 
of EPS and TSR volatility on the performance choices made by firms in CEO compensation, 
after controlling for firm-specific-characteristics, industry and the identity of the remuneration 
advisor. In this, we extend the analysis to consider plans which use both EPS and TSR 
simultaneously as performance measures, and also those which use neither EPS nor TSR, 
categories which together make up more than half our sample, but which all previous studies 
have neglected to consider, opting instead for a simplistic EPS vs TSR dichotomy. We find 
evidence in line with optimal contracting theory as firms select performance measures which 
are less volatile in nature and our findings also indicate that some remuneration advisors have 
a clear preference for some performance measures over others. The descriptive statistics show 
that there exists significant variation in the design of compensation contracts. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
underlying literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 provides an overview of the plan 
structure. In Section 4, we discuss the methodology of our research. Section 5 presents the data 
analysis and empirical results of the model. Section 6 focuses on the detailed design of 
compensation contracts. Section 7 provides a summary and conclusion. 
2! Theory, Related Literature, and Hypothesis Development 
!
The separation of ownership and control represents a classical principal-agent problem 
as management tends to pursue activities that increase their own well-being. Optimal 
contracting theory views stock-based compensation as a key corporate governance mechanism 
that mitigates or aligns the divergent interests of management and shareholders of the company. 
Compensation schemes ought to be designed in such a way as to serve this objective, and firms 
ought to seek more sophisticated ways of tying executive compensation to firm performance. 
Hence, optimal contracting theory predicts that firms should incorporate all performance 
measures which might motivate managers to act in the manner desired by the firm’s 
shareholders. 
The Association of British Insurers (ABI), now merged with IVIS, in 1996 published guidelines 
on the framework of long-term incentives, which promote the following principles1: 1) 
Performance targets should be challenging and linked to corporate performance, 2) 
Performance targets should be transparent and subject to disclosure, and 3) Performance in 
long-term incentives should be measured relative to an appropriate peer group or other relevant 
benchmarks. Interestingly, neither agency theory nor the ABI guidelines specifically mention 
to employ certain performance measures in compensation contracts, but the theory can be 
applied to determine the properties of suitable metrics in order to evaluate executive’s 
performance. Hence, this study will seek to determine how firms use different performance 
metrics in order to align executives' interests with those of shareholders. 
 
2.1! Literature Review 
2.1.1! The Development of the Study of Performance Measures 
!
In examining the history of the construction of executive compensation contracts, we observe 
that the first generation of performance contracts predominantly utilised market-based 
measures, while subsequent development has seen the wider introduction of accounting-based 
measures, and a greater sophistication in the levels and mechanisms of vesting of the rewards. 
We also see a move towards much greater transparency and disclosure in executive pay-setting. 
 
By way of illustration, Larcker (1983) finds that only twenty-five firms use accounting-based 
plans in CEO compensation contracts, while Kumar and Sopariwala (1992) find only sixty-two 
companies that adopt plans with accounting performance conditions attached. Later studies 
have charted the introduction of non-financial measures in bonus contracts, for example, 
customer service, production and safety became prevalent in equity-based contracting processes 
(Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 1997). Kaplan and Norton (1992) develop a non-financial measure 
technique known as a ‘balanced scorecard’ in compensation contracts, which employs various 
performance measures with different relative weights, unlike the specific use of total 
shareholder return, return on investments or customer satisfaction.   
  
Later on, the study of executive compensation has moved into examining the pay-performance 
relationship. A number of studies (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 
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1 Presently, ABI guidelines is part of the Investment Association. 
https://www.ivis.co.uk/guidelines  
[accessed 20 June, 2017]. 
Gregg et al., 2012 and Conyon and Peck, 1998) describe the use of the financial and accounting 
performance measures in examining the pay-performance relationship. Sloan (1993) examines 
the role of accounting measures in compensation contracts, and documents that the use of 
earnings in a compensation pay setting will tend to shield compensation from market 
fluctuations. He also suggests that if the stock price is a relatively noisy element, then 
compensation will be more sensitive to earnings than stock returns. Further, Lambert and 
Larcker (1987) study the relative weights placed on market and accounting performance 
measures in executive compensation packages for US firms, suggesting that firms place more 
weight on market performance measures when accounting performance measures are more 
volatile. 
 
Until the reforms brought in by the DRRR in 2002 and Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in 2006, the disclosure of details of executive compensation contracts was limited in the UK 
and the US respectively, however, annual reports now provide much greater transparency. 
Previous research which found a prevalence of non-financial measures in executive 
compensation may, therefore, have been employing an implicit rather than an explicit approach 
(Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004). 
Since then, researchers have started to hand-collect compensation data on US firms, for 
example, Kim and Yang (2010) examine performance metrics in annual bonus contracts during 
2006-2009, Bettis et al. (2010) study 983 US equity-based grants with performance contingency 
from 1995 to 2001, and De Angelis and Grinstein (2015) analyse the performance criteria in 
US equity-based grants in 2007. However, far fewer studies have examined the UK. 
The only comparable UK study for the present analysis is that of Zakaria (2012), who presents 
a breakdown of performance measures into options and restricted shares for UK firms for the 
single year 2002/2003. The study provides a breakdown of performance targets into EPS and 
TSR measures. We extend this study by taking into account all elements of equity compensation 
including matching plans and also analyzing the breakdown of minimum and maximum 
threshold targets required to achieve minimum and upper quartile vesting, neither of which are 
captured by Zakaria (2012). In addition, our empirical analysis includes companies which 
employ EPS and TSR measures in combination. We consider this to be an important 
methodological advance since this latter category accounts for over 45% of the firms in our 
sample.  
 
2.1.2! The Problem of Volatility in Measuring Management Effort 
!
Holmstrom (1979) formulates the theory of the optimal contact under the moral-hazard 
problem, and develops the “Informativeness Principle”, that any performance measure that 
reveals information about the level of effort provided by an agent (CEO) should be included as 
a performance metric. He further shows the negative relationship between the noise present in 
a performance measure and its usefulness in a compensation package. Further, Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999b) conclude that CEO pay becomes less sensitive to performance as TSR 
volatility increases. High pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) evidences a greater alignment 
between the interests of shareholders and executives. PPS is, therefore, the responsiveness of 
pay to the change in company performance.  
Firms should choose performance measures that strengthen the link between pay and 
performance in an executive compensation package. Consequently, CEOs should prefer a less 
volatile performance measure to one which is more volatile, as this reduces uncertainty as to 
their level of reward, leading them to make more effort. Hence, optimal contracting theory 
assists the empirical design of the performance measure, stating that it should not be noisy and 
insensitive to managerial actions. 
Over time, one accounting measure, namely, earnings, has become predominant as a 
performance metric in incentive contracts. One possible explanation is that earnings figures are 
more under the direct control of management (Sloan, 1993; O’Byrne, 1990; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). By contrast, stock prices are affected by market factors which are outside 
the control of management. In a working paper, Chemmanur et al. (2010) highlight how 
management can manipulate earnings per share, and show that firms repurchase shares from 
the market in order to meet EPS targets. An increase in stock repurchases will decrease the 
number of shares in the market, hence, an increase in EPS can be engineered.  
Until the 1980s, the use of accounting performance measures was considered to be the only 
remedy to the issue of volatility in share prices, making market-based measure an unreliable 
indicator of management effort. Firms' use of market and accounting-based measures have been 
observed by Murphy (1999) and Pass et al. (2000). However, in the last two decades, it has 
become increasingly common to use comparator groups within TSR measures in order to 
identify and reward relative outperformance and factor out fluctuations which are due to overall 
market movements. Holmstrom (1982) conducts a pioneering study in measuring relative 
performance evaluation (RPE), focusing on the need to remove common risk within 
compensation packages by using the share price relative to a peer group of companies within 
the same industry or market. RPE in compensation contracts enables common uncertainties to 
be filtered out and provides more efficient schemes (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
More recently, Li and Wang (2016) explore the relationship between volatility and the choice 
of each individual long-term accounting measure in the compensation contracts of US firms. 
Their results show that firms are more likely to choose those performance metrics which are 
less volatile in nature. 
 
2.1.3! Hypotheses 
!
In light of the above, we formulate the following research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 a: The higher the volatility of the market-based (TSR) measure, the greater the 
likelihood of choosing an accounting-based measure (EPS) only. 
Hypothesis 1 b: The higher the volatility of the accounting-based measure (EPS), the greater 
the likelihood of choosing a market-based measure (TSR) only. 
 
2.1.4!  Isomorphism in Executive Compensation Contracts 
!
The separation of ownership and control can affect the manager's choice of action that 
potentially influences the wealth of a company's shareholders; efficient contracts should, 
therefore, be designed in such a way that greater manager-shareholder interest alignment can 
take place (Conyon et al., 2009). However, other constraints and influences inform the 
construction of executive contracts: in its simplest form, companies are liable to copy existing 
practice, and compensation consultants may diffuse the adoption of certain pay practices to 
other firms, as they may tend to recommend similar structures to a number of different clients. 
Additionally, executives may bring with them their own expectations of how contracts should 
be structured, drawing on their own experience-based standard as developed through service 
on other boards.   
More formally, the literature of institutional theory addresses these using a discourse of 
"isomorphism" to account for these socially-mediated similarities (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). 
Three different forms of isomorphism have been identified: mimetic, coercive and normative. 
Mimetic isomorphism exists when firms follow what other firms are doing in the absence of 
clear guidelines (Porac et al, 1999; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). Normative isomorphism exists 
when firms follow standard procedures owing to the influence of common personnel, for 
example, when executives moving from one board to another leads to common practices being 
introduced (O’ Reilly et al, 1988; Perkins and Hendry, 2005). Coercive isomorphism arises 
from regulations or codes of conduct forcing the adoption of certain pay-performance practices 
(Barreto and Baden-Fuller, 2006). In regard to executive compensation, we, therefore, suspect 
that all three forms of isomorphism may be involved. 
2.1.5!  The Structure of Compensation Contracts 
!
While the above notes studies focusing on the pay-performance relationship for UK and US 
firms, fewer studies have looked at the detailed structure of compensation contracts, and here, 
most research has focused on US firms. Murphy (1999) conducts an analysis on the pay 
practices of US firms, looking at the level and structure of incentive contracts in terms of shares 
and options employed by the firm within different industries, but does not detail the breakdown 
of these performance measures. The US pay-setting process is both less transparent and less 
complex compared to the UK, which makes the research of executive compensation in the UK 
potentially more informative. 
Pass et al. (2000) analyse the breakdown of options and long-term incentives for 150 large 
companies in the UK, and note that there has been a rapid increase in the use of long-term 
incentives. Further, they recommend that firms should operate TSR based schemes and 
benchmark it with appropriate index. Their study does not shed light on vesting percentage at 
minimum and maximum thresholds targets. 
 
2.1.6!  The Role of Compensation Consultants 
!
With an increase in the complexity of equity-based pay, the role of the compensation consultant 
has become crucial as they are considered experts with technical knowledge on the design of 
compensation packages (Bender, 2011). It has become a widespread practice in US and UK 
firms to hire compensation consultants to advise on the design and implementation of 
compensation packages. Conyon et al. (2009) report that the majority of firms in the FTSE 350 
Index hire two consultants, with one consultant providing data services and the other providing 
advice on remuneration packages. Most firms use compensation consultants to gain a 
perspective on industry-wide compensation practices and those of their competitors. It is 
possible that as consultants devise new innovative compensation designs, pay-performance 
practice becomes similar across their clients they advise. Hence, this represents an example of 
normative isomorphism. Since there is an increase in the number of long-term incentive 
arrangements in the market, practices will tend to evolve and solidify. 
Usually, a remuneration committee will seek independent advice from a remuneration 
consultant on the design of their compensation packages. The consultant further assists 
remuneration committees in determining the structure and level of compensation, and the 
performance measure to be applied.  
However, little is known about the factors that influence the actual choice of performance 
measure. One potential explanation is that firms select specific performance metrics based on 
the standard practice by their competitors in their industry, or in the market. 
 
 
 
3! Executive Compensation Plan Structure 
!
3.1! The design of executive compensation contracts 
In this section, we analyse the design of executives’ equity compensation. We find that long-
term incentives take different forms, and usually, in the UK context, “long-term” refers to those 
plans that last for three years.  
We identify three very different forms of compensation. Firstly, traditional share options are 
options on the company’s stock with a non-zero strike price, so that the executive receives cash 
equal to the difference between the share price and the exercise price on the day they are 
exercised. Secondly, performance share plans (PSPs), also known as nil cost options, are 
options on the company’s stock with a zero strike price, which pay cash on the day they are 
exercised in a similar manner. Finally, share matching plans, also known as co-investment 
plans, are those in which executives invest part of their annual bonus in shares, and if long-term 
performance conditions are met after three years, they receive a multiple of their initial 
investment in the form of shares. For some firms, this deferral is compulsory rather than 
voluntary. For example, in a '2:1' match, a deferral of 200,000 shares leads to the grant of an 
additional 200,000 shares if performance targets are met. Finally, long-term compensation may 
be given in the form of cash 
Performance targets can be further classified as the range of company performance in which 
rewards will vest: many plans have lower threshold targets, which are the minimum that must 
be attained for any rewards at all to vest, and upper threshold targets, at which the maximum 
possible reward is paid out. Further, performance targets can be classified as being relative to a 
benchmark or comparator group, or absolute. 
Long-term incentive plans will not usually vest without the achievement of performance 
hurdles as assessed over a three-year performance period. These awards are made on a rolling 
basis and are frequently updated or modified depending on a company’s objectives. 
!
3.2! The Dataset 
Our sample consists of 400 UK with largest market capitalization, from 2007 to 2015. Data on 
executive compensation contracts comes from the commercial MEIS database, supplemented 
by hand-collected data from annual reports for 2007 to 2010. To ensure data integrity, MEIS 
data was verified by checking against hand-collected annual reports.  
We study a total of 3400 long-term incentive plans. Many of these plans are inactive and not 
used in a current year. As a result, our final sample consists of 2970 long-term incentive plans. 
We categorize industries using the top-level FTSE ICB (Industry Classified Benchmark), 
consisting of the following industries: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, 
financial, healthcare, technology, oil and gas, utilities and industrials. 
 
4! Methodology 
4.1! Independent Variables 
For independent variables, we use volatility in earnings per share (hereafter, EPS volatility) and 
volatility in total shareholder return (hereafter, TSR volatility). Furthermore, we also include 
corporate governance characteristics: board size, percentage of non-executive directors, firm 
age and CEO tenure which, potentially, have an influence on performance choices. 
Following Zakaria (2012), we employ a set of control variables using free cash flow, market to 
book value and sales. We hypothesize that the choice of performance measure will be 
influenced by sales and firms will select market-based performance measures if they find 
appropriate peers to compare their relative performance. Murphy (1999) finds that firms with 
higher level of growth opportunities are more likely to employ TSR over internal based 
measures, as TSR incentivizes manager of higher growth firms to smooth out any fluctuations.  
All of these variables relate to the previous year as the observation. MTB is defined as the 
Market to Book value, using the MTBV datatype from Datastream. 
Total shareholder returns and earnings per share are derived from the Return Index data 
published by Datastream. In addition, we use Datastream to collect the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. We collect data for board size from Bloomberg. 
We follow Zakaria (2012) and define TSR volatility as the past Total Return volatility, 
measured quarterly, over the prior 36 months. We define EPS volatility as the volatility of EPS 
growth measured on a semi-annual basis, over the prior 36 months, since UK firms disclose 
EPS twice a year. 
 
4.2! Sample Construction 
Firms use a wide range of performance measures in CEO compensation and have different 
payment methods, which include m atching plans, options and performance share plans.  
Interestingly, most firms use the same performance measure category for all payment methods 
(i.e. options, restricted stock shares and matching plans). A few firms, however, employ 
different performance measure categories for different payment methods, for example, 
choosing EPS and TSR jointly in one long-term incentive plan while using EPS only in an 
additional long-term incentive plan.  
For the purposes of the present analysis, if more than one long-term incentive plan exists, we 
include only firms which have the same performance measure category across all long-term 
incentive plans. This restriction loses 3% of the overall sample by firm-years. 
Initially, our sample consists of 2970 active long-term incentive plans. For the purposes of 
descriptive statistics, we exclude plans that rel 
te to one-off circumstance, e.g. mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs, retention plans and 
recruitment plans, since in most cases, these are specific to named executives, and many do not 
have any performance conditions attached. 
We also exclude those firms which use a combination of TSR and some other performance 
measure (not including EPS or income-based measures) in a single year, and also, those firms 
which use a combination of EPS and some other performance measure (not including TSR) in 
a single year. 
Additionally, to be included in a regression, a company must have valid corporate governance 
variables and valid data on total shareholder return and earnings per share for the prior three 
years for each year. The sample used for regression analysis is at the firm level and consists of 
1931 firm-years. 
 
4.3! Data Coding 
The central testable prediction of the optimal contracting theory is that volatility in performance 
measures will affect the choice of performance measure. Accordingly, we test this using a 
multinomial logit model, in which the dependent variable, namely, the choice of performance 
measure, consists of four different categories: we code "EPS and TSR jointly" as category 0, 
TSR as category 1, EPS as category 2, and "neither EPS nor TSR" as category 3. 
 
In the following analysis, the "neither EPS nor TSR" category includes plans where the 
performance measure is either qualitative or where it includes neither a TSR nor an earnings 
measure. 
 
4.4! Model Estimation 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Let Pi,j  be the probability that the ith firm chooses performance measure j , given by  
, , ,Pr( )   for , {0,1,2,3}i j i j i kP R R k j j= > ≠ ∈  ,                 (1) 
where Ri,j is the maximum utility attainable for firm i if it chooses performance measure j.  Then, 
'
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where Xi is a vector of firm characteristics, and βj is a vector of corresponding coefficients.  
If the stochastic terms εi,j are independent and identically distributed, and follow the Weibull 
distribution, then the probability of performance choices can be modelled by the multinomial 
logit model: 
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In this model, we use the firms that choose EPS and TSR jointly as a performance measure as 
the reference category and normalize the corresponding vector β0 = 0. Hence, the probability 
of firm i having (EPS and TSR jointly) as a performance measure in a compensation contract 
is given by: 
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And the probability of firm i having EPS only, TSR only, or (neither EPS nor TSR), is given 
by: 
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for j = 1,2, and 3.                   . (5) 
We estimate this model using maximum likelihood. The estimated coefficient βj should be 
interpreted as the change in the probability of choice j (EPS, TSR, or neither EPS nor TSR) 
relative to the probability of choosing (EPS and TSR jointly), for a one-unit change in the 
independent variable. 
The multinomial logit model can be seen as simultaneously estimating a binary logit model 
comparing among the dependent categories and reference category (Long, 1997). When 
estimating a multinomial logit model, we need to select a reference category to which the 
estimated coefficient will relate.  
The results from the model will tell us whether the type of performance measure is influenced 
by volatility where Xi is a vector of firm characteristics. Our model is therefore: 
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for firm i at time period t, where ɛi,t is the error term  
5! Data Analysis and Empirical Results 
5.1! Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1! Performance Measures Used in Long-Term Incentive Arrangements 
!
Table 1 exhibits the breakdown of performance measures used in compensation contracts by 
plan type. We observe that EPS only, and TSR only, are the most popular performance metrics 
used in long-term incentive plans, followed by ROE and EBIT. Many firms in our sample use 
more than one performance measure, resulting in 5124 performance measures in 2970 plans. 
Market-based measures (i.e. TSR, Share Price and Total Property Return) together account for 
72% of long-term incentives. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the breakdown of plans that use different performance target 
categories. When all plans are considered, Panel B reveals that 31% of plans choose EPS and 
TSR jointly as a performance measure, making this the most frequently employed category. 
Further, 42% of plans use only one performance measure, while in unreported statistics, we 
find that 51% use two measures, and 7% use multiple performance metrics.  
Panel C presents statistics for the firms included in the regression, where we include only those 
which use TSR only, EPS only, TSR and EPS jointly or neither TSR nor EPS. When these are 
considered, 27% of the firms TSR only, 25% use EPS only, 39% of use EPS & TSR jointly, 
and 9% of plans use neither TSR nor EPS as a performance metric. This indicates that many 
plans are using EPS and TSR jointly as a performance target. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents a summary of the statistics for firm characteristics for the sample 
period and reports the means, medians and standard deviations. The median (mean) board size 
is 9 (8.67), consistent with Ozkan (2007). The average (median) proportion of non-executive 
directors of 49.73% (47%) and the mean (median) value of EPS volatility is 0.30 (0.15). The 
mean value of TSR volatility is 0.05, suggesting that EPS is a much more volatile measure 
compared to TSR. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the correlations between the independent variables of the sample. 
The correlation between the EPS volatility and TSR volatility is only -0.02. Turning to the 
correlations between the control variables, we find that the largest correlations are no higher 
than 39% (Panel B of Table 5.5.2). Thus, we infer that concerns of multicollinearity are not a 
major issue in the data. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports summary statistics for compensation consultants. New Bridge Street 
is the most popular consultant, with a market share of 34.4%, followed by Deloitte (14.9%), 
Kepler (11.9%), PwC (9.8%), Towers (10.4%) and Mercer (1.2%). The "big six" remuneration 
consultants account for 83% of total market share, similar to the US, where the largest six 
remuneration advisors account for more than 67% of total market share (Cadman et al., 2010). 
Other smaller advisors include MEIS, EY, MM&K, Fit, Aon Hewitt, M C Lutyens, Pinsent, 
RSA Consulting, KPMG and Hay. 
Table 1: Performance measures used in long-term incentive arrangement 
Performance share 
plans
2176 1721 38 1415 269 56 135 34 88 106 73 133 3 4063
Share options 347 114 8 244 15 0 16 6 0 5 0 7 8 423
Matching plans 447 190 5 234 69 9 32 3 31 26 28 11 5 638
Total 2970 2025 51 1893 353 65 183 43 119 137 101 151 16 5124
Other 
qualitative 
measures
Other 
accounting 
measures
No condition TotalTSR Share price EPS ROE TPR Profit Revenue Cash flow NAVNo.
 
This table presents the number of plans falling into each respective category. 
“No.” indicates the number of plans, “TSR” indicates the use of Total Shareholder Return, defined as the increase in share price in addition to dividend income, 'Share price' 
indicates the use of share price alone, i.e. the increase in share price exclusive of dividend income. “EPS” indicates the use of earnings per share, “ROE” indicates the return on 
common equity as a measure, and “NAV” indicates the use of net asset value. “TPR” stands for total property return, in the case of Real Estate firms. “Total” indicates the total 
number of performance measures used across all plans so that one plan can have several performance measures. 
Other qualitative measures include the use of non-financial/personal objectives in the executive compensation contracts (e.g. customer satisfaction, safety, health and strategy). 
Other accounting measures include all other accounting measures which cannot be classified in other categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Performance measures categories in long-term incentive arrangements 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6   
  
TSR only 
TSR and 
other  
measure 
EPS only 
EPS and 
other 
measure 
EPS & TSR 
Neither 
TSR nor 
EPS 
Total 
including all 
plans 
Total of 
columns 1, 3, 
5 and 6  
Panel A Performance share plans 508 379 289 98 792 111 2177 1700 
 Options 71 7 193 0 69 36 376 369 
 Matching plans 59 69 112 44 58 75 417 304 
 Total  638 455 594 142 919 222 2970 2373 
          
Panel B Performance share plans 17.1% 12.8% 9.7% 3.3% 26.7% 3.7%   
 Options 2.4% 0.2% 6.5% 0.0% 2.3% 1.2%   
 Matching plans 2.0% 2.3% 3.8% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5%   
 Total  21.5% 15.3% 20.0% 4.8% 30.9% 7.5% 100.0%  
          
Panel C Performance share plans 21.4%  12.2%  33.4% 4.7%  71.6% 
 Options 3.0%  8.1%  2.9% 1.5%  15.5% 
 Matching plans 2.5%  4.7%  2.4% 3.2%  12.8% 
 Total  26.9%  25.0%  38.7% 9.4%  100.0% 
   
This table presents the number of plans falling into each respective category. 
 
“TSR only” indicates the number of plans that exclusively select TSR as a performance measure. “TSR and others” indicate the number of plans that use TSR in combination 
with other performance measures (e.g. net asset value, return on common equity, total property return and revenue). “EPS and TSR” indicates the number of plans that use TSR 
and EPS jointly as a performance metric. “Neither EPS nor TSR” indicates the number of plans that consists of performance measures other than total shareholder return and 
earnings). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Firm Level Characteristics 
Variable Mean Median 
 
Std.-Dev Variable Mean Median 
 
Std.-Dev 
EPS Volatility 0.30 0.15 
 
1.15 % of non-executive directors 49.73 47.00 
 
2.47 
TSR Volatility 0.05 0.02 0.20 Ln (Free Cash Flow) 7.02 6.90 0.40 
Market to Book 3.85 2.27 4.23 Ln (Sales) 6.75 6.60 1.74 
Board Size 9.00 8.67 2.60 Ln (CEO Tenure) 1.38 1.50 0.95 
Ln (Firm Age) 3.05 3.04 1.04     
 
Panel A reports summary statistics of the key variables used in the hypotheses tests to examine the impact of volatility on the performance choices.
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Main Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) EPS Volatility 1         
(2) TSR Volatility -0.02 1        
(3) Market to book -0.00 -0.02 1       
(4) Ln (Board size) 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 1      
(5) Non-executive directors % -0.04* -0.02 0.05** 0.22*** 1     
(6) Ln (Sales £’000) -0.10*** -0.03 0.01 0.30*** 0.36*** 1    
(7) Ln (Free cash flow) -0.05** -0.03 0.00 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.39*** 1   
(8) Ln (CEO Tenure) -0.05** -0.00 -0.01 -0.09**** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.06*** 1  
(9) Ln (Firm Age) -0.11*** 0.02 -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.018 -0.00 0.00 0.13*** 1 
Panel B reports the pairwise correlation of the main independent variables. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
Panel C: Compensation Consultant Statistics 
Name of Advisor No of Plans Percent 
Deloitte 377 14.96% 
High New Bridge Street 868 34.44% 
Kepler 301 11.94% 
Mercer 32 1.27% 
Others  430 17.06% 
PwC 249 9.88% 
Towers 263 10.44% 
Total 2520 100% 
Panel C reports breakdown of compensation consultants
Table 4 details the multinomial logit regression results for the determinants of performance 
choices. In multinomial logit, the dependent variable is limited, hence its interpretation differs 
from that of an OLS regression coefficient. In order to test whether the volatility of a 
performance measure impacts the choice of performance measure category employed by the 
firm, in Model 1, we control for industry and the identity of the consultant, and in Model 2, we 
additionally control for plan effects (i.e. options, performance share plans, and matching plans). 
Therefore, in Table 5, we include marginal effects to clarify the magnitude effect of each 
variable. Marginal effects represent the change in the dependent variable that is produced by a 
unit change in the independent variable.  
We observe from Table 2 that categorizing by the type of plan, in contrast to performance share 
plans, options are rarely used in this sample. Instead, many firms use nil-cost options that are 
categorized as performance share plans. 
5.2! Empirical Results 
5.2.1! Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Table 4 reports the results of the multinomial logit model with four performance choices. The 
R2 of 0.23 is in line with the previous studies of Zakaria (2012) and Crespi et al. (2004).  
In Model 1, Column 1 reveals that firms are significantly more likely to choose TSR only rather 
than TSR and EPS jointly if they have higher EPS volatility. Additionally, firms are 
significantly less likely to use TSR only rather than TSR and EPS jointly if they have higher 
TSR volatility. 
In Column 2, relating to the selection of EPS only, we find a negative and highly significant 
coefficient for EPS volatility, indicating that firms are less likely to use EPS only, over the 
alternative of EPS and TSR jointly, when firms have volatile EPS. Our findings are consistent 
with Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993), who argue that firms prefer to choose 
performance measures that are less volatile. This is also in line with the predictions of the 
optimal contracting theory, suggesting that volatility has a significant role in the choice of 
performance measure. However, we do not find evidence of an association between the 
probability of choosing neither TSR nor EPS and the volatilities of EPS and TSR. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of sales is negatively associated with the selection of TSR 
only and neither EPS nor TSR category relative to reference category so that firms with higher 
sales are significantly less likely to use TSR alone. It could be argued that as large firms tend 
to be pioneers of innovative designs (Kole, 1997), and are more likely to include several 
different performance measures in their remuneration contracts. 
De Angelis and Grinstein (2015) compare the likelihood of using either market-based or 
accounting-based measure for US firms, in contrast to our methodology of comparing to a 
reference group of EPS and TSR together. While they find that firms with longer CEO tenure 
are more likely to use accounting based measures, we find that firms with longer CEO tenure 
are more likely move away from using EPS and TSR jointly, to using TSR alone or EPS alone. 
We speculate that this may be because CEOs dislike dual targets and that longer tenure gives 
them more influence in the pay-setting process. One possible explanation of this result could 
be that their study considers a different dataset from a separate demography. 
Our findings also show that firms rely more on accounting-based measures, and less on TSR 
alone, as firm age increases. These are in line with De Angelis and Grinstein (2015), who 
likewise find that young firms tend to use market-based measures rather than accounting 
measures in performance contracts. They argue that this is in line with optimal contracting 
theory since market value is a better indicator of long-term outcomes than current-year 
accounting measures. 
The coefficients of market to book ratio are insignificant in Column 1 and Column 2, indicating 
that firms with higher growth opportunities have no clear preference for choosing EPS only or 
TSR only. 
Firms with a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board are less likely to favour 
EPS only but are more likely to favour TSR only relative to the base category. These results 
suggest that firms with a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board are 
motivated to employ TSR, either alone, or in conjunction with EPS, as it is in the greater interest 
of shareholders.  
Concerning consultant-specific effects, the reference group used in the present study for the 
identity of the remuneration advisor is “Deloitte”. Based on the results in Column 1, firms that 
use HNBS, Kepler, PwC and the “Others” category as their remuneration consultants are more 
likely to employ TSR only as a performance measure, relative to Deloitte. This is in line with 
Kuang et al. (2014), who find that Deloitte is less likely to use TSR only than New Bridge Street 
or Towers Perrin. 
However, firms that hire HNBS, Towers and consultants in the “Others” category are less likely 
to favour EPS over EPS and TSR jointly, relative to Deloitte. Finally, we detect a significantly 
positive association between the choice of Mercer and the choice of neither TSR nor EPS 
relative the base category. These findings strongly suggest that compensation consultants play 
an influential role in the design of remuneration contracts, and indicates the operation of 
normative isomorphism, as consultants who provide services to multiple firms use similar 
performance metrics.  
Turning now to industry-specific factors, the reference category used is the “consumer services” 
group. Basic Materials and Utilities are significantly more likely to choose TSR only, and less 
likely to choose EPS only, than EPS and TSR jointly. Consumer Goods and Technology firms 
are significantly more likely to choose EPS only over EPS and TSR jointly. Financials are 
significantly more likely to choose TSR only, and EPS only, and neither EPS nor TSR than 
(EPS and TSR jointly), whereas the reverse is true for Industrials. Finally, Oil & Gas are 
significantly less likely to choose EPS only over EPS and TSR jointly. 
Since these industry dummies are significant after controlling for all the other independent 
variables, this provides strong evidence for norms operating inside distinct industries, so that 
normative isomorphism is one of the key influences on the choice of performance measure. 
Broadly speaking, these results do not vary when controlling for plan type as shown in Columns 
4, 5 and 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts against EPS 
volatility, TSR volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-executive dire, free cash flow, 
CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). “TSR 
vol” is the three-year volatility before plan adoption, “EPS vol” is the three-year volatility in EPS before 
plan adoption. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. Industry dummies are included in both specifications. Detailed description 
of variable definitions can be found in Appendix A to Chapter 5. 
 Model 1 Model 2 (with Plan Dummies) 
Variable TSR EPS 
Neither 
TSR nor 
EPS 
 
TSR EPS 
Neither 
TSR nor 
EPS 
   Column 1 Column 2 Column 3  Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
EPS vol 0.119*** -0.120** 0.051  0.116*** -0.115** 0.023 
  (0.021) (0.058) (0.033)  (0.020) (0.056) (0.037) 
TSR vol -3.673*** -2.193 -1.726  -3.935*** -2.218 -1.140 
  (1.304) (1.334) (1.642)  (1.349) (1.356) (1.126) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.001 -0.060**  0.002 0.000 -0.094*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.025)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) 
Ln (Board size) 1.341*** 0.874*** 0.154  1.417*** 0.869*** 0.294 
  (0.323) (0.307) (0.427)  (0.330) (0.322) (0.433) 
Non-executives% 0.024*** -0.021*** -0.012  0.025*** -0.019*** -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales) -0.362*** -0.035 -0.219***  -0.348*** -0.015 -0.181** 
  (0.059) (0.060) (0.084)  (0.059) (0.062) (0.089) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.550*** -0.687*** -0.107  0.638*** -0.604*** -0.238 
  (0.202) (0.218) (0.357)  (0.210) (0.220) (0.345) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.201*** 0.225*** 0.239*  0.194*** 0.228*** 0.131 
  (0.066) (0.076) (0.127)  (0.069) (0.079) (0.132) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.324*** 0.135* -0.388***  -0.316*** 0.152** -0.381*** 
 (0.0634) (0.074) (0.121)  (0.064) (0.075) (0.133) 
Industry        
Basic Material 0.586** -1.657*** -0.994**  0.707*** -1.570*** -0.685* 
  (0.264) (0.471) (0.458)  (0.270) (0.461) (0.411) 
Consumer Goods -0.501** 0.592*** -16.03***  -0.428* 0.608*** -16.37*** 
  (0.246) (0.199) (0.240)  (0.251) (0.205) (0.276) 
Financials 1.846*** 0.696** 1.959***  1.782*** 0.700** 2.083*** 
  (0.307) (0.346) (0.363)  (0.314) (0.354) (0.389) 
Healthcare 0.833** -1.068* -16.07***  0.898** -1.007* -16.52*** 
  (0.364) (0.592) (0.375)  (0.362) (0.589) (0.383) 
Industrials -0.921*** -1.495*** -2.198***  -0.853*** -1.455*** -2.041*** 
  (0.185) (0.202) (0.370)  (0.188) (0.204) (0.382) 
Oil & gas 0.183 -0.830* -15.93***  0.218 -0.793* -16.59*** 
  (0.328) (0.470) (0.418)  (0.319) (0.467) (0.461) 
Technology -1.278*** 0.471* -0.255  -1.079*** 0.532** -0.307 
  (0.365) (0.260) (0.390)  (0.370) (0.269) (0.409) 
Utilities 0.906*** -2.116*** -1.733  0.969*** -1.956** -1.293 
 (0.315) (0.780) (1.078)  (0.329) (0.797) (1.107) 
Consultant dummies 
       
HNBS 0.729*** -0.447** -1.092***  0.781*** -0.403* -1.009*** 
  (0.224) (0.202) (0.315)  (0.228) (0.206) (0.330) 
Kepler 0.837*** -0.080 -1.524***  0.873*** -0.062 -1.446** 
  (0.256) (0.247) (0.577)  (0.261) (0.251) (0.574) 
Mercer 0.243 2.388*** 2.799***  0.170 2.327*** 2.974*** 
  (1.230) (0.806) (1.019)  (1.380) (0.837) (1.075) 
Other 0.905*** -0.622** 0.247  0.926*** -0.600** -0.323 
  (0.278) (0.278) (0.326)  (0.283) (0.292) (0.358) 
PwC 0.805*** -0.237 -0.702  0.814*** -0.212 -0.977** 
  (0.277) (0.269) (0.461)  (0.284) (0.277) (0.488) 
Towers -0.228 -1.132*** -0.994***  -0.153 -1.163*** -1.168*** 
  (0.268) (0.253) (0.367)  (0.271) (0.259) (0.448) 
Constant  -5.406*** 3.886** 3.141  -6.032*** 3.659** 5.752** 
 (1.407) (1.546) (2.529)  (1.512) (1.635) (2.541) 
        
Plan types dummies     Yes   
Observations 1931    1931   
Log-likelihood -1834    -1767   
Pseudo R-squared 0.230    0.263   
  
 5.2.2! Marginal Effects 
Addition to multinomial logit coefficient and the levels of significance, we have also shown the 
marginal effects, evaluated at the mean, of a change in the independent variable in Table 5. The 
marginal effects display the relative importance of each explanatory variable in predicting the 
probability of each event occurrence. For a dummy variable, marginal effects show by how 
much the probability of performance choices will change with a change in a dummy variable; 
Table 5: Marginal effects of the impact of volatilities on performance choices 
Marginal effects of the impact of volatilities and corporate governance variables on performance 
choices in compensation contracts for Model 1. Marginal effects represent the effect of a unit change 
in the variable on the probability of an outcome (EPS, TSR, EPS and TSR, Neither EPS nor TSR). 
 TSR EPS TSR & EPS Neither TSR nor EPS 
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
EPS vol 0.035*** -0.026*** -0.008 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
TSR vol -0.692** -0.091 0.783** -0.000 
 (0.341) (0.203) (0.329) (0.007) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.015) 
Ln (Board size) 0.248*** 0.044 -0.291** -0.001 
 (0.067) (0.048) (0.145) (0.121) 
Non-executives % 0.007*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Ln (Sales) -0.080*** 0.018** 0.061*** -0.000 
 (0.030) (0.008) (0.014) (0.021) 
Ln (Free cash flow) 0.171*** -0.140** -0.029 -0.000 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.048) (0.043) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.030 0.020 -0.052*** 0.000 
 (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.031) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.082* 0.042*** 0.0412 -0.000 
 (0.049) (0.011) (0.028) (0.075) 
Industry dummies     
Basic materials 0.248*** -0.196*** 0.006 -0.058*** 
 (0.053) (0.029) (0.052) (0.021) 
Consumer goods -0.115*** 0.203*** 0.005 -0.093*** 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.041) (0.016) 
Financials 0.256*** -0.101*** -0.257*** 0.101*** 
 (0.048) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) 
Healthcare 0.307*** -0.170*** -0.043 -0.093*** 
 (0.0741) (0.042) (0.071) (0.016) 
Industrials -0.081** -0.144*** 0.300*** -0.074*** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.034) (0.016) 
Oil & gas 0.134* -0.116** 0.074 -0.093*** 
 (0.078) (0.049) (0.076) (0.016) 
Technology -0.208*** 0.185*** 0.036 -0.014 
 (0.037) (0.054) (0.055) (0.026) 
Utilities 0.345*** -0.218*** -0.047 -0.079*** 
 (0.074) (0.029) (0.071) (0.021) 
Consultant dummies     
HNBS 0.184*** -0.126 -0.054 -0.004 
 (0.067) (0.139) (0.201) (0.386) 
Kepler 0.183* -0.078 -0.099 -0.005 
 (0.096) (0.148) (0.236) (0.455) 
Mercer -0.150** 0.495 -0.363*** 0.019 
 (0.073) (1.616) (0.093) (1.648) 
Other 0.237 -0.160* -0.077 0.000 
 (0.160) (0.092) (0.061) (0.041) 
PwC                                                                                                                                   0.187*** -0.101 -0.082 -0.003 
 (0.059) (0.126) (0.185) (0.324) 
Towers 0.012 -0.167 0.158 -0.003 
 (0.072) (0.133) (0.105) (0.280) 
while for a continuous variable, they show how much the probability will change with a one-
unit change in the value of the independent variable. 
In Table 5, Column 1 reveals that the estimated marginal effect of EPS volatility on TSR only 
is 0.035. This implies that an increase of 1 unit in 3-year earnings per share volatility raises the 
probability of choosing TSR only by 3.5 percentage points. The results in Column 2 show that 
a 1-unit increase in 3-year EPS volatility results in 2.6 percentage points decreases in the 
probability of choosing EPS only as performance criteria; this result is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The pattern of results observed in Model 1 and Model 2 is in line with the 
optimal contracting hypothesis, since under optimal contracting theory, the more volatile the 
performance measure, the less likely it is to be chosen as a performance measure. Hence, 
volatility in EPS impacts the choice of performance measure as seen in both models. These 
results are in line with Banker and Datar (1989). Nevertheless, from Column 3, EPS volatility 
is not associated with the probability of choosing EPS and TSR jointly.  
In Table 5, Column 3, the coefficient on TSR volatility for choosing EPS and TSR jointly is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that a unit increase in 3-year TSR 
volatility is associated with a 78.3 percent increase in the probability of EPS and TSR jointly 
being selected. This shows that TSR volatility is an important factor in the selection of EPS in 
conjunction with TSR in compensation contracts. However, 3-year TSR volatility is not 
significant in influencing the choice of EPS alone. This suggests that TSR alone is not viewed 
as a reasonable way to control for noise, consistent with Holmstrom (1982) and that high TSR 
volatility is countered by using EPS and TSR jointly as a guard against volatility in any one 
measure. The inclusion of an accounting measure in firms with higher values of TSR volatility, 
therefore, helps to filter some out noise in TSR. 
The results in Table 5, Column 1 indicate that when remuneration advisors HNBS, Kepler and 
PwC consultant category provide advice to firms, the probability of selecting TSR only as a 
performance measure is 18%, 18% and 19% points higher respectively than Deloitte. However, 
relative to Deloitte, none of the other consultants shows a preference for EPS-contingent plans 
as shown in Column 2. A likely interpretation is that since Deloitte is an accounting firm, they 
tend to frequently recommend plans with accounting performance conditions.  
By contrast, in Column 3, which relates to the choice of EPS and TSR jointly, only Mercer has 
a significant coefficient, so that the choice of Mercer is associated with a 36 percentage point 
reduction in the probability of selecting EPS and TSR jointly. Finally, in Column 4, relating to 
the choice of neither EPS nor TSR, none of the coefficients are significant. This is interesting 
since it shows that the institutional isomorphism identified above, pertains only to the issue of 
selecting TSR only. It appears that some advisors hold much more positive views on TSR only, 
but that they do not hold such strongly divergent on the other performance measures. 
The probability of firms operating TSR-based plans in basic materials, financials, healthcare, 
oil and gas, and utility industries is 0.25, 0.26, 0.31, 0.13 and 0.34 higher respectively than 
firms in the consumer services group (reference category). However, the probability of 
employing EPS-contingent plans is 18% and 20% in technology and consumer goods industries 
respectively. Technology firms prefer EPS based performance metrics and one possible 
interpretation is that executives are incentivized through methods which generate net income.  
In case of Dummy variables in column 2 indicate that industries other than technology and 
consumer goods have a reduced probability of employing EPS exclusively than consumer 
services industry. More interestingly, no industry except industrials employs EPS and TSR 
jointly significantly more than the reference category. Furthermore, there exists a negative and 
statistically significant association between all industries except financial and the selection of 
neither EPS nor TSR. Further, untabulated results reveal that within the real estate and insurance 
sectors of the financial industry, the use of NAV and ROE measures is more prevalent. 
According to column 1, a one-unit increase in log sales results in 8 percentage points decrease 
in the probability of TSR being selected. While these results are not consistent with Zakaria 
(2012), who finds that large firms more often use TSR as a performance measure than EPS, her 
study was based on a much older sample, from 2003/2004. Also, sales has a strong marginal 
effect with an increase in the probability of EPS and TSR jointly by 6.1 percentage points for a 
one-unit increase in log sales. However, the marginal effect for non-executive directors (column 
1, TSR only) and (column 2, EPS alone) is 0.007 and 0.005 percent respectively, showing that 
a greater presence of non-executive directors influences the choice of the performance measure. 
There is an interesting contrast in the effects of volatility in performance measures: whereas in 
columns 1 & 2, they are strongly significant in influencing the likelihood of EPS alone or TSR 
only being selected, in column 4, they play no role in the likelihood of neither EPS nor TSR 
being selected. Likewise, corporate governance factors and remuneration consultants do not 
significantly influence the probability of choosing the neither EPS nor TSR category. This 
clearly highlights the significant impact of volatility on the choice of EPS and TSR being 
selected by a firm. Nonetheless, the results also show that for firms within the financial industry, 
there is a 0.10 probability of choosing the neither EPS nor TSR category. This could be because 
of strong dependence on measures other than total shareholder returns or earnings within these 
industries. 
Summarising the results from the marginal effects, our results suggest that out of all four 
categories, the use of TSR only in incentive contracts is industry-specific, and some consultants 
prefer using one performance measure relative to another. Industry forces drive the choice of 
accounting and financial performance measures, providing evidence of normative isomorphism 
in the design of pay packages. Firms with highly volatile TSR prefer to choose EPS and TSR 
jointly as a performance measure. One possible explanation is even if TSR is volatile, firms 
still use TSR along with an accounting measure to filter out noise in the market-based measure. 
The use of EPS and TSR jointly is influenced by firm size and in general is not specific to 
consultant and industry; only one consultant (Mercer) and financial industry show a strong 
negative association with selection of EPS and TSR jointly. 
5.2.3!  Robustness 
!
In this section, we subject the previous results to a variety of robustness tests, all of them are 
available in the Appendix. We use different measures of volatility: we use basic EPS and basic 
TSR volatilities instead of using cumulative EPS and cumulative TSR volatility, as many of 
these plans use basic EPS as a performance measure. The negative relationship between the 
choice of EPS as a performance measure and EPS volatility still holds as shown in Table 11. In 
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 11, we also introduce industry-adjusted EPS and TSR volatility as a 
benchmark for the volatility measure. Interestingly, once these industry-adjusted measures are 
added, the main results remain qualitatively similar and show that firms with high values of 
TSR volatility are more likely to choose TSR over EPS and TSR jointly. The third robustness 
test includes the use of time fixed effects. The main results again do not change qualitatively. 
Table 13 presents the results when we use total assets to replace sales and find similar results 
on this alternative proxy. Finally, in Table 14, we also include EPS along with net income 
measure and find consistent results that firms with higher volatile earnings are less likely to 
prefer earnings measures. 
 
 
 
6! Design of Compensation Contracts 
Next, we turn our attention to the design of compensation contracts. Every performance 
measure has hurdles with lower and upper threshold targets: for minimum vesting, firm 
performance needs to trigger the lower threshold target, and for full vesting, firms must meet 
the upper threshold target, as specified in the executive compensation contract. Vesting refers 
to the restriction on ownership of shares being lifted, meaning that executives can now transfer 
or sell the shares they are entitled to. For example, in a standard three-year long-term incentive 
plan, if the performance-contingent shares are offered in 2010, then executives can vest their 
shares in 2013 based on the subsequent achievement of performance targets. The amount of 
shares vesting depends upon where firm performance lies between the lower and upper 
threshold ranges. The value of these awards is usually determined by the share price on the day 
the share vests. Usually, from the date of the grant, executives have ten years before options or 
restricted stock shares lapse. 
TSR is usually measured relative to a sector, or an index or a bespoke (i.e. hand-picked) group 
which the firm chooses. Frequently, the minimum reward is triggered if the firm’s growth in 
TSR ranks in excess of the median (50th percentile) group of companies in their comparator 
group, and for full vesting of equity, a firm’s TSR growth should usually rank in the upper 
quartile (75th percentile) relative to the comparator group over the three-year performance 
period. Vesting between these two limits is usually on a straight-line basis. 
ABI (1999) recommended that EPS growth targets should be measured in absolute terms in 
executive compensation contracts. Generally, firms use either EPS absolute growth or EPS 
growth in excess of the Retail Price Index (RPI). EPS is most commonly expressed as a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over a three-year performance period. As an example 
of EPS thresholds, a typical minimum performance hurdle is 3% p.a. (i.e. 9% over the 
performance period). The firm needs to have a minimum threshold of an average growth rate 
of 3% p.a. in order for the CEO to vest 25% of the equity. In order to get a maximum payout 
(100%) of the equity, firms typically have to exhibit an average growth rate of 6% p.a. (i.e. 18% 
over the performance period). Some firms use EPS growth benchmarks against RPI or CPI. 
Different firms in the same sector may select different vesting criteria. As an example, in 2012 
Atkins, a multinational firm in the support services industry, used only EPS as a performance 
measure in their LTIPs. In order to trigger the basic reward, Atkins should meet a minimum 
performance hurdle of 5% annual growth rate in EPS resulting in 25% of the equity vesting. By 
contrast, in 2012, Michael Page, another multinational firm in the support services industry, 
minimum performance hurdle was set at EPS growth of 5% per annum leading to 50% of the 
equity vesting. 
6.1! Market-Based Measures 
6.1.1! Peer Group Choices for TSR Only Contracts 
!
Once firms decide to use market-based measures in their compensation contracts, the next key 
step is to select the peer group against which to compare their own performance. The 
Government’s Directors’ Remuneration Report (2002) requires companies to disclose the peer 
firms used in determining executive compensation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Market-based performance targets and relative benchmarks 
Market-based Measure PSPs Share options Matching plans 
Relative to TSR    
Bespoke (Disclosed) 614 25 56 
Bespoke (Not Disclosed) 13 0 0 
Bespoke index 142 5 17 
Bespoke sector 25 0 13 
Bespoke sector and index 36 6 0 
Index 566 54 49 
Sector 83 1 8 
Sector and index 168 6 25 
TSR (Underpin) 11 4 0 
Absolute TSR    
Target share price 38 8 5 
TSR absolute growth 63 13 22 
Total  1759 122 195 
The above table indicates the respective number of plans that use market-based measures in remuneration 
contracts. “Bespoke” indicates when group members are hand-picked by the firm. “Sector” and “index” indicate 
the use of a specific sector or index, respectively, as a comparator group (e.g. the FTSE 250 Support Services 
Index). “Bespoke sector” indicates the use of a peer group of companies from a specific sector (e.g. oil companies). 
“Bespoke sector” indicates the use of a peer group of companies from a specific sector (e.g. oil companies). 
“Bespoke index” refers to the use of specific companies from an index (e.g. choosing the 51st to 150th firms in the 
FTSE350 as ranked by market capitalization). “Bespoke sector and index” is the use of self-selected firms from 
both a sector and an Index (e.g. the FTSE All Share Media companies excluding FTSE 100 participants). “Sector” 
indicates the use of specific sectors as a comparator group (e.g. Media/Mining). “TSR absolute” refers to the 
absolute growth in total shareholder returns. “Target share price” refers to the achievement of a specific target 
share price. “TSR underpin” refers to when it is used as a precondition with another performance measure. 
Table 6 shows a breakdown of benchmarks relating to TSR as a performance measure. The 
results indicate that 34% and 32% of the plans use bespoke (disclosed and undisclosed) and 
index TSR, respectively, to proportion the vesting of equity compensation. It is easier for firms 
to choose indices, as this requires less effort than the self-selection of peer groups. However, 
choosing the right peer group is crucial, otherwise, it will introduce volatility to the payout, 
eventually demotivating executives.2 
On the other hand, only 4.7% of firms use TSR absolute growth as a performance measure 
within their equity plans. The results also show that it is more common that TSR is subject to 
comparison with a peer group than a specific rate of increase (i.e. absolute TSR growth) in all 
types of long-term incentive arrangements. One possible explanation is that absolute TSR does 
not take into account the general movements in the market and is not a true reflection of 
executives’ effort (Barty and Jones, 2012). Infrequently, some firms also use a specific share 
price figure in their long-term incentive plans. Only 9.5% of plans use both sector and index 
together as a relative benchmark. Firms in the general retail, travel and leisure, media and real 
estate investment sectors more commonly use sectors as a TSR peer group. 
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2 This is discussed in more details by Kapinos et al. (2014) in the industry paper titled, Relative Total 
Shareholder Return (TSR) Plan Design Across the Atlantic, Aon 
https://www.radford.com/home/insights/articles/2014/relativ.e_tsr_plan_design_across_the_atlantic.asp  
[accessed on July 21, 2016]. 
 
Next, we analyse the comparator groups within the components of long-term incentive plans, 
where we find that many firms use bespoke peer groups in their plans. We further break down 
the different market indices to study the various peer group used in long-term incentive plans. 
Table 7: Comparator Groups (Index) in Relative to TSR Plans 
 
Table 7 summarizes the comparators used by companies to benchmark their own TSR performance. “FTSE 250” 
refers to the firms in the FTSE 250 UK Index; similarly, “FTSE 100”, “FTSE 350” and “FTSE Small Cap” refer 
to the firms in the FTSE 100, FTSE 350 Index and FTSE Small Capitalization Index, respectively. “Others” refers 
to firms that use alternative categories of the index (e.g. HSBC/Morgan Stanley Index). Firms may have more than 
one plan, each of which may reference a different comparator group. 
Table 7 shows that 47% of the plans in the sample use the FTSE 250 peer group. Only 16% of 
plans choose TSR relative to the FTSE 100 Index, and interestingly, 21% of the plans are 
identified as using FTSE Small Cap peer group, so that the FTSE 250 peer group is the most 
widely used comparator group choice in compensation contracts. 
 
6.1.2! Vesting Levels in TSR Based Contracts 
After making the choice of performance measure and peer group, firms choose payouts at 
different levels of performance. While it is common for US companies to have a maximum 
payout between 100% and 200% of base salary, the payout policy for UK firms rarely exceeds 
100% of base salary.3 According to ABI guidelines, vesting conditions in performance 
measures should be fully transparent, explained and linked to the achievement of shareholders’ 
value (ABI, 2013). 
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3Kapinos et al., Relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR) Plan Design Across the Atlantic, Aon, December 15, 
2014. 
https://www.radford.com/home/insights/articles/2014/relative_tsr_plan_design_across_the_atlantic.asp  
[accessed on July 25, 2016]. 
Index PSPs Share options Matching plans 
 
Small Cap 
115 8 17 
FTSE 100 102 3 4 
FTSE 250 277 18 20 
FTSE 350 32 12 5 
FTSE All Share 22 7 0 
Others (HSBC /Morgan Stanley) 18 6 3 
Total 566 54 49 
Table 8 
Panel A:  The distribution of vesting levels at median threshold and upper quartile targets in 
LTIP schemes. 
Median threshold 
vesting level 
PSPs Share 
options 
Matching 
plans 
Upper quartile 
vesting level 
PSPs Share 
options 
Matching 
plans 
0.00%-10.00% 44 4 16 50.01%-60.00% 0 0 0 
10.01%-20.00% 217 3 46 60.01%-70.00% 32 0 4 
20.01%-30.00% 1303 72 117 71.01%-80.00% 161 6 28 
30.01%-40.00% 93 26 8 81.01%-90.00% 204 17 32 
40.01%-50.00% 57 10 8 91.01%-100.00% 1329 95 131 
Not Disclosed 25 0 0 Not Disclosed 16 0 0 
Complex 6 3 0 Complex 6 0 0 
Single threshold 3 0 0 Single threshold 0 0 0 
Underpin 11 4 0 Underpin 11 4 0 
Total 1759 122 195 Total 1759 122 195 
        
0% vesting  37 4 16     
25% vesting 951 45 78 100% vesting 1162 84 118 
 
Minimum vesting of awards ranges from 0% to 50% after meeting lower threshold targets. Vesting at upper 
quartile ranges from 60% to 100%. “Single Threshold” refers to firms using only a single threshold hurdle in 
their plans. “0% Vesting” refers to contracts which assign a zero percent vesting of equity for the achieving 
median TSR performance. “Upper quartile vesting levels” presents the percentage of equity which vests when 
TSR performance is at least equal to the upper quartile of the comparator group’s TSR. Most plans set 100% 
equity vesting if firms’ performance is at least equal to the upper quartile of the comparator group. The 
remaining plans, where less than 100% of the equity vests at this level, are here classified as “Outperformance 
TSR plans” and are detailed in Panel B below. “Underpin” refers to the situation in which TSR is used as an 
initial indicator in conjunction with another performance measure. 
 
Table 8.  
Panel B: Outperformance TSR plans 
Maximum Vesting Levels PSPs Options Matching plans 
Upper Quintile 177 13 17 
Upper Decile 79 4 9 
Outperformance Over the Index 244 21 26 
Outperformance Over the Median 97 0 25 
Table 8, Panel B reports the breakdown of plans where TSR performance criteria for maximum vesting is above 
the upper quartile of comparator groups’ TSR. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, there is a wide variation in the percentage of equity which 
vests if the firm’s relative TSR places it in at least the 50th percentile rank over a three-year 
performance period. In 2.7% of our plans, 0% of the award vests at this level. 3% of plans set 
between 0% to 10% to vest at this level, and 72% of plans set between 20% and 30% of equity 
to vest at this level. Of these, 52% of plans set exactly 25% of equity to vest, making it the most 
popular vesting level used by these firms. By contrast, in 4% of our plans, 50% of the award 
vests after meeting median threshold level. This implies that two firms could set different 
minimum vesting percentages of equity at median performance relative to the comparator 
group, so that the firm with the lower percentage of equity vesting at the minimum vesting 
threshold has the tougher performance conditions, provided they use the same peer group. 
The upper quartile vesting levels reveal that 66% of the plans’ awards permit maximum payout 
(full vesting) if the TSR of the company exceeds the performance of 75% of the comparator 
group (upper quartile) over a three-year performance period, while only 9% of plans allow 
between 70% and 80% of equity to vest after meeting upper quartile performance. This clearly 
suggests the presence of either normative or mimetic isomorphism, since a high proportion of 
firms choose to adopt identical practices in this regard.  
There exists diversity within the LTIP plans awarded by firms: the presence of similar 
performance measures but with different comparator groups introduces a considerable variation 
in the median and upper quartile threshold vesting in practice, adding further complexity to the 
design of compensation contracts, even though vesting levels do not vary widely if we break 
down these long-term incentive plans. 
The term “underpin” functions as a threshold or hurdle. In cases where firms have two or more 
performance measures, one of them may be designated as an “underpin” so that the underpin 
performance target must be achieved before any of the awards will vest. As an example of this, 
consider Dechra Pharma that granted a performance shares plan in 2010 with a primary EPS 
target, and a TSR “underpin” performance target. The underpin TSR performance target 
required TSR performance to be at least equivalent to the median group of companies, and once 
this was met, the EPS performance measure with lower and upper threshold targets came into 
operation. In the case that the TSR underpin target was not met, no equity would vest, even if 
the EPS upper threshold target was attained. 
As described here earlier, many plans employ a standard set of TSR growth thresholds: the 
initial vesting threshold is set to the median of the comparator group, and the upper vesting 
threshold is set to the upper quartile of the comparator group. Away from these standard 
settings, Panel B of Table 5 shows the alternative upper thresholds. For example, Wincanton in 
2010 selected an upper threshold of TSR to be greater than or equal to 20% per annum in excess 
of the FTSE 250 Index for maximum payout and so is included in the “Outperformance over 
the Index” category.  In some plans, the maximum threshold is above the upper quartile of the 
comparator group, usually, the upper quintile or decile, while for others, some firms choose 
plans in which growth in TSR should be equal to the median plus an additional margin, in order 
to trigger maximum payout. Panel B of Table 8 reveals that that out of 1759 performance share 
plans, 244 use outperformance relative to an index in order for the maximum payout to vest. In 
contrast, 177 plans require firms’ TSR growth relative to the group of companies to be in the 
upper quintile for the maximum vesting. In contrast to Zakaria (2012) and Pass et al. (2000), 
there has been a shift in the landscape of remuneration contracts, as firms increasingly opt for 
TSR performance criteria that set performance beyond the upper quartile for maximum vesting. 
6.2! Accounting Based Measures 
6.2.1! Breakdown of Types of EPS 
Table 9: Type of EPS plans (performance share plans/options/matching plans) 
  
Adjusted 
EPS 
Diluted 
EPS 
Underlying 
EPS 
Basic EPS 
Cumulative 
EPS 
Normalized 
EPS 
Aggregate 
EPS 
Relative 
RPS 
Underpin Total 
Real EPS 
Growth 
 
116/34/12 49/4/6 26/4/0 486/108/118 8/0/1 20/6/5 0/3/0 0/0/0 32/4/6 737/163/148 
Absolute EPS 
Growth 
 
83/5/15 22/2/5 15/0/8 169/38/32 17/0/0 11/0/0 2/0/0 11/0/0 0/0/0 330/45/60 
Target EPS 
figure 
 
59/0/7 3/2/0 17/0/0 228/32/10 24/6/9 0/0/0 17/0/0 0/0/0 0/0/0 348/40/26 
Table 9 shows the different forms of EPS used by firms in their plans. 
In a similar manner to the TSR targets analysed previously, EPS targets also have initial and 
maximum vesting thresholds which function in a similar way. The principal difference arises 
in that EPS target is usually absolute, and do not refer to a comparator group, as with TSR 
targets. These descriptive statistics indicate that firms incorporate diverse performance targets, 
and as before, lower or upper threshold targets often have different vesting levels of equity. 
We note from Table 9 that within long-term incentive arrangements, there are different 
definitions of EPS owing to different calculation methods, though most firms prefer using basic 
earnings per share, 68% of plans choose a performance target based on basic EPS growth in 
excess of RPI, while 55% use EPS absolute growth over a three-year performance period. After 
basic EPS, the next most popular performance measure is adjusted earnings per share in excess 
of RPI, with 15.4% of the plans employing this, and about 5.6% of plans use diluted EPS in 
excess of RPI as performance criteria. Diluted earnings per share denote the conversion of 
dilutive securities into common stock, resulting in an adjustment of the number of shares 
outstanding as well as earnings. Unlike TSR, EPS is measured in absolute terms rather than 
relative to the companies. Relative EPS is less common as firms find it difficult to find a peer 
group for which the profit growth is similar to that of the company. 
6.2.2! EPS targets and Vesting levels 
!
Next, Table 10 reveals that while the minimum threshold range is relatively compressed, the 
upper threshold range is more dispersed, whether real or absolute terms are used. Turning first 
to minimum thresholds, Panel A of Table 10 reports minimum thresholds for EPS where these 
are stated in real terms, as an RPI + x% figure. 82% of plans lie in the range of RPI + 2% p.a. 
to RPI + 6% p.a., and a small number of plans do not disclose vesting levels within their 
compensation contracts. 
Panel B of Table 10 documents the distribution of EPS absolute growth targets, as opposed to 
the real-terms growth targets presented in Panel A. 79% of the plans, have a minimum threshold 
hurdle range between 2% p.a. to 8% p.a. 
Turning next to upper thresholds, Panel A of Table 10 reveals that 69.6% of the plans in our 
sample have an upper threshold target range of RPI + 7% p.a. to RPI + 15% p.a. with a particular 
concentration in the range of RPI + 9% p.a. to 9.99% p.a. These results are in line with Ward 
(2000), who finds that EPS growth plus RPI of 2% is most commonly used in incentive plans 
from 1994 to 1998, and also with Zakaria (2012), who finds that 68.1% of plans have a 
minimum vesting threshold in the range of RPI + 2% p.a. to RPI + 6% p.a. Zakaria (2012) does 
not disclose ranges for upper thresholds. With regards to absolute targets in Panel B, 79% of 
plans have upper growth targets between 7% and 16.99%. The descriptive statistics of Zakaria 
(2012) show that during 2002/2003, less than half of plans with EPS based compensation 
contracts employed upper thresholds hurdles, showing that the use of upper threshold targets 
have increased over time, and overall targets are more demanding. 
Table 10 additionally presents information on the level of equity which vests at the minimum 
EPS target. In Panel A, discussing real EPS targets, 61.6% of the plans have a vesting range of 
between 20.00% and 29.99%. Similar to the comparable results for TSR, minimum equity 
vesting has a particular peak at 25%, which is used by 44.5% of plans. In Panel B, concerning 
absolute EPS targets, 54% of plans have a vesting of between 20.00% and 29.99%, and there is 
a peak at 25%, used by 42% of plans. Overall, these results suggest that normative or mimetic 
isomorphism is not limited to the choice of performance measure but is also present in the 
setting of growth targets and equity vesting ranges. 
 
Table 10. Panel A: Distribution of EPS growth in excess of RPI required for minimum and maximum threshold (in per annum equivalent). 
Minimum threshold targets (RPI + x %) PSPs Options Matching plans Maximum threshold targets (RPI + x %) PSP Options 
Matching 
plans 
0.01% to 0.99% 8 0 0 1.00% to 1.99% 1 6 0 
1.00% to 1.99% 14 0 0 2.00% to 2.99% 3 7 15 
2.00% to 2.99% 222 64 62 3.00% to 3.99% 1 1 0 
3.00% to 3.99% 196 7 47 4.00% to 4.99% 24 11 20 
4.00% to 4.99% 132 38 11 5.00% to 5.99% 27 10 22 
5.00% to 5.99% 71 8 3 6.00% to 6.99% 39 20 10 
6.00% to 6.99% 24 2 4 7.00% to 7.99% 86 29 13 
7.00% to 7.99% 6 7 0 8.00% to 8.99% 46 11 0 
8.00% to 8.99% 6 4 0 9.00% to 9.99% 156 27 24 
9.00% to 9.99% 13 3 0 10.00% to 10.99% 45 4 7 
10.00% to 10.99% 0 0 0 11.00% to 11.99% 124 4 6 
11.00% to 11.99% 4 0 0 12.00% to 12.99% 27 0 14 
12.00% to 12.99% 1 4 0 13.00% to 13.99% 8 21 1 
13.00% and above 3 0 0 14.00% to 14.99% 64 6 7 
Not disclosed 4 0 0 15.00% to 15.99% 20 2 3 
No lower threshold 1 22 15 16.00% and above 31 0 0 
Relative to the Index 0 0 0 Not disclosed                                3 0 0 
Underpin 32 4 6 Underpin 32 4 6 
Minimum vesting levels    Maximum vesting levels    
1.00% to 9.99% 41 2 25 90.00% to 99.99% 737 159 148 
10.00% to 19.99% 71 2 9 Not disclosed                                0 0 0 
20.00% to 29.99% 491 97 58 Complex 0 0 0 
30.00% to 39.99% 56 20 18 Single threshold 0 0 0 
40.00% to 49.99% 29 16 17 Underpin 32 0 6 
Not Disclosed 14 0 0 Total  737 163 148 
Complex  0 0 0     
Single Threshold 3 22 15 0% Vesting  26 2 12 
Underpin 32 0 6 25% Vesting  376 77 14 
Total  737 163 148      
Panel A and B of Table 10 present the distribution of EPS growth corresponding to the minimum and maximum threshold target range. 
Table 10. Panel B: Distribution of EPS absolute growth required for minimum and maximum threshold (in per annum equivalent). 
Minimum absolute threshold targets PSPs Options Matching Maximum absolute threshold targets PSPs Option Matching 
0.01% to 0.99% 1 0 0 4.00% to 4.99% 0 3 3 
1.00% to 1.99% 0 0 0 5.00% to 5.99% 8 0 0 
2.00% to 2.99% 18 8 8 6.00% to 6.99% 2 5 1 
3.00% to 3.99% 21 12 17 7.00% to 7.99% 8 13 0 
4.00% to 4.99% 86 6 5 8.00% to 8.99% 15 7 10 
5.00% to 5.99% 78 10 11 9.00% to 9.99% 38 6 9 
6.00% to 6.99% 26 0 8 10.00% to 10.99% 12 1 5 
7.00% to 7.99% 19 4 7 11.00% to 11.99% 55 1 3 
8.00% to 8.99% 9 0 0 12.00% to 12.99% 22 1 2 
9.00% to 9.99% 28 4 4 13.00% to 13.99% 20 1 14 
10.00% to 10.99% 4 0 0 14.00% to 14.99% 63 7 9 
11.00% to 11.99% 3 0 0 15.00% to 15.99% 5 0 0 
12.00% to 12.99% 1 0 0 16.00% to 16.99% 15 0 4 
13.00% to 13.99% 0 0 0 17.00% to 17.99% 0 0 0 
14.00% to 14.99% 8 0 0 18.00% to 18.99% 0 0 0 
15.00% to 15.99% 7 0 0 19.00% to 19.99% 20 0 0 
Not disclosed 8 0 0 20.00% and above 28 0 0 
Single threshold 2 1 0 Not disclosed 8 0 0 
Relative to the Index 11 0 0 Relative to Index 11 0 0 
Minimum vesting levels    Maximum vesting levels    
1.00% to 9.99% 34 3 6 90.00% to 99.99% 314 45 60 
10.00% to 19.99% 50 6 3 Not disclosed 10 0 0 
20.00% to 29.99% 191 12 33 Complex  6 0 0 
30.00% to 39.99% 26 20 6 Single Threshold 0 0 0 
40.00% to 49.99% 5 3 12 Underpin 0 0 0 
Not disclosed 14 0 0 Total  330 45 60 
Complex  8 0 0     
Single Threshold 2 1 0 0% Vesting  29 3 2 
Underpin 0 0 0 25% Vesting   144 12 27 
Total  330 45 60      
7! Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive sample of 400 large firms from 2007 until 2015, we examine the 
influence of volatility and corporate governance variables on firms’ choice of performance 
measures. We find that the choice of a performance measure is not arbitrary, but instead, 
corporate governance factors and the volatility of both EPS and TSR influence the choice of 
firm performance measure. Consistent with the optimal contracting approach, we find that firms 
tend to choose performance measures which are less volatile, implying that contracts are 
designed optimally. Further, remuneration advisors and the volatility in performance measure 
neither influence the selection of  TSR nor EPS category. 
Some consultants exhibit a preference to select TSR, while other consultants prefer the use of 
EPS, so that consultant identity is an important factor in the choice of performance metrics in 
compensation contracts, providing evidence of normative isomorphism within executives’ 
compensation contracts. Furthermore, firms with higher sales prefer to choose a combination 
of EPS and TSR as a performance metric, indicating that larger firms prefer to rely on a 
combination of EPS and TSR performance measures as key indicators of the firm’s value 
creation.  
This study provides an in-depth analysis of the design of executive contracts and the different 
plan characteristics of long-term incentive arrangements. We observe from our descriptive 
statistics that there has been a decline in the use of options, while performance share plans 
appear to remain a key element of long-term incentive plans. 
Key findings from our descriptive analysis show that firms use various types of market-based 
measures. Among market-based measures, the use of relative TSR is most frequent, and the 
FTSE 250 is the most common Index employed in relative TSR plans. However, firms are 
increasingly setting stretching targets away from traditional benchmarking through the use of 
outperformance plans, in which maximum vesting is above the traditional median or upper 
quartile.  
Our findings also indicate that firms use different versions of EPS and that growth in EPS can 
be measured in absolute terms or in growth in excess of RPI. We observe that a minimum 
threshold range of 2% p.a. to 8% p.a. is most popular in plans using an EPS absolute growth 
target, while for plans using an EPS growth benchmark against growth in RPI, the target range 
of 2% p.a. to 6% p.a. is most popular. There exists a wider spread of upper threshold targets in 
plans that use EPS benchmark against growth in RPI compared to absolute EPS targets: the RPI 
targets are concentrated in the range of RPI + 7% p.a. to RPI +15% p.a., while EPS absolute 
growth targets mostly range from 7% p.a. to 17% p.a. After adjusting for the effect of RPI in 
EPS targets, we observe that minimum and maximum threshold targets are set lower in absolute 
EPS growth targets, and hence, achievement of targets is higher in firms using absolute EPS 
growth figures. Since the ABI guidelines provide no clear structure for determining the 
appropriate standards, we argue that this represents a case of mimetic isomorphism, in which 
firms copy each other’ standards. 
This study will reassure shareholders and institutional holders since we show that the choice of 
performance measure in compensation contracts tends to reflect optimal contracting. From a 
policy perspective, we find that remuneration advisors play an influential role in contract design 
and there exist many forms of isomorphism in one form or another, which arise from hiring 
consultants, selection of performance measures, setting targets and payout level. 
 
  
Table A1 
Variable Definition 
This table provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in this 
chapter. 
Dependent Variable                          Definition 
Performance measure 0 if long-term incentives consist of EPS and TSR jointly, 1 if firms’ 
incentive grants have only TSR condition, 2 if firms’ incentive grants 
consist of EPS measure exclusively and 3 if firms’ incentive grants 
contain neither EPS nor TSR condition 
 
Independent Variables Definition 
 
TSR vol 
 
The standard deviation in stock returns three-years before the plan 
adoption 
 
TSR vol The standard deviation in EPS growth three-years prior to the plan 
adoption 
 
Market to book ratio 
 
 
Book value of the common equity divided by the market value of the   
common equity 
Firm Age Firm Age is defined as the year the firm was founded and is a proxy of 
firm maturity. It is the natural logarithm of the difference between the 
years in consideration4 and the year firm was founded plus one 
 
Tenure 
 
The natural logarithm of number of years served as the CEO and is a 
proxy of CEO experience 
 
Non-executive directors % Percentage of number of non-executive directors over total number of 
directors on board 
 
Board size Total number of directors on the board 
Sales Natural Logarithm of the firm’s sales/turnover 
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4 In the case of our study, the sample is from 2010 to 2014, Thus, for example, for the firm which was founded in 
2008 and the year of consideration being 2010, the firm age is (2010-2008+1) 3. 
 Table 11: Robustness tests 
Multinomial logistic model estimating the probability of performance measures in compensation 
contracts 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts against EPS 
volatility, TSR volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-executive directors, free cash 
flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively 
 
Model  1 (Basic EPS Volatility and TSR Volatility)                      Model  2 (Industry adjusted EPS and TSR Volatility) 
 
Variable TSR EPS 
Neither 
earnings 
nor TSR 
TSR EPS 
Neither 
earnings 
nor TSR 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
EPS vol 0.008*** -0.014** 0.005 0.070** -0.299*** 0.009 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.033) (0.105) (0.050) 
TSR vol -0.397*** -0.178 -0.095 -3.749*** -0.560 -1.203 
  (0.122) (0.156) (0.142) (0.765) (0.517) (1.167) 
Market to 
book 
0.001 -0.002 -0.057** 0.0014 -0.001 -0.059** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.005) (0.025) 
Board size 1.394*** 0.795*** 0.161 1.359*** 0.869*** 0.135 
  (0.320) (0.305) (0.427) (0.322) (0.309) (0.425) 
Non-
executives% 
0.022*** -0.020*** -0.013 0.022*** -0.022*** -0.013* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales 
£’000) 
-0.371*** -0.039 -0.219*** -0.342*** -0.025 -0.210** 
  (0.060) (0.059) (0.082) (0.059) (0.060) (0.082) 
Ln (Free Cash 
Flow) 
0.533** -0.575*** -0.121 0.535*** -0.655*** -0.054 
  (0.215) (0.196) (0.313) (0.204) (0.208) (0.304) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.162** 0.232*** 0.225* 0.165** 0.207*** 0.225* 
  (0.067) (0.076) (0.127) (0.067) (0.075) (0.127) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.354*** 0.150** -0.409*** -0.346*** 0.132* -0.402*** 
  (0.063) (0.074) (0.121) (0.063) (0.075) (0.120) 
Constant -4.990*** 3.195** 3.261 -4.969*** 3.650** 2.947 
 (1.446) (1.434) (2.272) (1.395) (1.496) (2.229) 
Industry 
effects 
Yes   Yes   
Consultant 
effects 
Yes   Yes   
Observations 1931   1931   
Log likelihood -1834   -1844   
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.23   0.23   
Industry-adjusted TSR vol is the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns growth minus the mean standard deviation of stock 
returns growth of the industry over three-year period  before plan adaptation and EPS vol is standard deviation of firm’s eps 
growth minus the mean standard deviation of eps growth of the industry over three-year period before plans. 
 
Table 12: Robustness test 
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts with time dummies 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts 
against TSR volatility, EPS volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-
executive directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the 
base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable TSR EPS 
 
Neither 
earnings nor 
TSR 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
  Multinomial logit model results 
Multinomial logit 
model results 
Multinomial 
logit    model 
results 
EPS vol 0.117*** -0.138** 0.049 
  (0.021) (0.062) (0.033) 
TSR vol -3.185** -1.247 -1.311 
  (1.330) (1.073) (1.206) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.002 -0.059** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) 
Board size 1.348*** 0.840*** 0.144 
  (0.321) (0.306) (0.425) 
Non-executives % 0.025*** -0.019*** -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales £’000) -0.361*** -0.034 -0.217** 
  (0.058) (0.060) (0.085) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.524*** -0.705*** -0.136 
  (0.203) (0.219) (0.361) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.218*** 0.273*** 0.254* 
  (0.0683) (0.079) (0.132) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.318*** 0.148** -0.382*** 
  (0.064) (0.074) (0.121) 
Constant -4.990*** 3.195** 3.261 
 (1.446) (1.434) (2.272) 
Industry effects Yes   
Consultant effects Yes   
Observations 1931   
Log likelihood -1827   
Pseudo R-squared 0.23   
!
!
!
! !
Table 13: Robustness test 
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts (using total assets as a proxy for firm size) 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts 
against TSR volatility, EPS volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-
executive directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the 
base category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Variable TSR EPS Neither earnings 
nor TSR 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
  Multinomial logit model results 
Multinomial logit 
model results 
Multinomial logit    
model results 
EPS vol 0.131*** -0.137** 0.070 
 (0.023) (0.062) (0.038) 
TSR vol -3.521*** -1.994 -1.610 
 (1.264) (1.256) (1.547) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.005 -0.063** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.025) 
Board size 0.655** 1.561*** 0.357 
 (0.325) (0.334) (0.443) 
Non-executives % 0.013** -0.010* -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Ln (Assets) -0.322*** -0.052 -0.253** 
 (0.069) (0.062) (0.099) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.119 -0.287 -0.194 
 (0.170) (0.263) (0.438) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.241*** 0.224*** 0.273** 
 (0.065) (0.072) (0.126) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.321*** 0.174** -0.386*** 
 (0.063) (0.075) (0.120) 
Constant -4.969*** 3.650** 2.947 
 (1.395) (1.496) (2.229) 
Industry effects Yes   
Consultant effects Yes  
 
Observations 1931   
Log likelihood -1845   
Pseudo R-squared 0.23   
Table 14: Robustness test  
 
Multinomial logit model estimating the probability of performance measures in 
compensation contracts (inclusion of EPS along with income measures in earnings 
category) 
 
Multinomial logistic regression of performance measures in compensation contracts against 
TSR volatility, EPS volatility, board size, market to book, firm sales, % of non-executive 
directors, free cash flow, CEO tenure and firm age. All results are relative to the base 
category of (EPS and TSR jointly). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variable TSR EPS 
Neither earnings 
nor TSR 
  Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
  Multinomial logit model results 
Multinomial logit 
model results 
Multinomial logit    
model results 
Earnings vol 0.129*** -0.109** 0.048 
 (0.023) (0.055) (0.035) 
TSR vol -3.858*** -2.070 -1.672 
 (1.133) (1.130) (1.447) 
Market to book 0.000 -0.001 -0.045** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) 
Board size 1.266*** 0.730** 0.014 
 (0.321) (0.305) (0.410) 
Non-executives % 0.025*** -0.021*** -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ln (Sales) -0.361*** -0.018 -0.168** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.080) 
Ln (Free Cash Flow) 0.551*** -0.721*** -0.083 
 (0.204) (0.222) (0.319) 
Ln (Tenure) 0.204*** 0.222*** 0.231* 
 (0.066) (0.075) (0.123) 
Ln (Firm Age) -0.336*** 0.102 -0.439*** 
 (0.061) (0.073) (0.117) 
Constant -4.969*** 3.650** 2.947 
 (1.395) (1.496) (2.229) 
Industry effects Yes   
Consultant effects Yes   
Observations 1964   
Log likelihood -1885   
Pseudo R-squared 0.23   
!
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